Daily Blast May 13, 2016

Earlier today, the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight (Los Angeles), issued an opinion in Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (May 13, 2016, B256792) __ Cal.App.4th __, analyzing whether an action alleging personal injuries caused by prenatal exposure to toxic substances is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4 (applicable to tort actions for birth and prebirth injuries), or the statute of limitations set forth in section 340.8 (applicable to tort actions for exposure to hazardous materials and toxic substances). (Slip opn., p. 2.) The court concluded section 340.4 governed, which was a departure from the Sixth District (San Jose), which held in Nguyen v. Western Digital Corporation (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, that section 340.8 supplants section 340.4 for claims based on prenatal injuries caused by exposure to hazardous materials and toxic substances. (Ibid.)

Lopez, age 12, was born with birth defects and developmental delays. (Slip opn., p. 1.) Lopez’s mother worked at a Sony facility during her pregnancy with Lopez. (Ibid.) In an action filed against Sony on January 6, 2012, Lopez alleged that when her mother worked at Sony, Lopez was exposed to chemicals for prolonged periods of time, which caused Lopez’s birth defects. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Sony moved for summary judgment on the ground that Lopez’s action was barred by the six-year limitation period of section 340.4, which expressly provides there is no tolling, under section 352, during the plaintiff’s minority. (Id. at p. 3.) In opposition, Lopez argued her action was subject to section 340.8, which imposes a two-year limitation period, but allows for tolling during the plaintiff’s minority, under section 352. (Ibid.) Lopez contended her action was timely because it was filed when she was a minor. (Ibid.) The trial court found section 340.4 applied and granted Sony’s summary judgment motion. (Id. at p. 4.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Slip opn., p. 13.) If read separately and in isolation, both section 340.4 and section 340.8 were unambiguous on their face, and both could be read to govern Lopez’s action, but the statutes were seemingly inconsistent. (Id. at p. 13.) The court looked at the legislative histories and construed the statutory provisions together in an effort to harmonize the law. (Id. at p. 5) The court noted, “[w]hen section 340.8 was enacted in 2004, the six-year limitations period for prenatal injuries had been in existence for six decades, along with the corresponding provision that tolling under section 352 did not apply to extend the limitations period for actions alleging birth or prebirth injuries.” (Id. at p. 8, italics in original.) Further, section 340.8 was enacted for a narrow and specific purpose, having nothing to do with prenatal injuries. (Id. at p. 7.) When the Legislature enacts a statute, courts do not assume it intended to overthrow long-establishes principles of law unless clearly expressed or necessarily implied. (Id. at p. 8.) The court declined to interpret section 340.8 as supplanting section 340.4. (Id. at p. 8.) The court concluded Lopez’s action was time-barred by section 340.4. (Id. at pp. 2, 13.)

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