Daily Blast June 9, 2015

The Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One (San Francisco) issued an opinion in Chan v. Curran (June 9, 2015, A138234) __ Cal.App.4th ___, analyzing a plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to MICRA’s noneconomic damages provision based upon the equal protection clause, the due process clause and the right to a jury trial. Plaintiff’s arguments were grounded on the assertion that she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. (Slip opn., p. 1.) The court concluded that plaintiff’s position was contrary to many well-established legal principles. (Ibid.)

As to her equal protection argument, the plaintiff relied on a “changed circumstances argument claiming (a) there no longer is a medical malpractice insurance crisis, (b) Proposition 103, under which the California Insurance Commissioner now sets medical malpractice insurance rates, has stabilized the insurance market, and (c) the ravages of inflation have decimated the economic significance of $250,000 in recoverable noneconomic damages.” Plaintiff asserted MICRA’s non-economic damages cap is no longer rationally defensible. (Slip opn., p. 12.) The court rejected this argument concluding that plaintiff “has not demonstrated that the fundamentals of our health care system and its interface with our tort and insurance systems that gave rise to the declared insurance crisis, no longer exist, rendering MICRA’s provisions of no plausible utility. Until such a showing can be made, the debate over the wisdom and efficacy of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains within the province of the Legislature and the voters of this state.” (Id. at p. 19.)

As to her due process argument, the plaintiff claimed that in today’s dollars, “$250,000 does not yield enough in contingency fees to make prosecuting most medical malpractice claims economically feasible, effectively denying most malpractice victims access to the courts.” (Slip opn., p. 25.) The court concluded that “while MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap may well influence an attorney’s decision to take or reject a medical malpractice case on contingency, the cap does not violate a due process right to court access.” (Id. at p. 30.) “MICRA’s damages cap does not invariably close the courthouse doors to malpractice plaintiffs. Even assuming it diminishes the number of cases taken by lawyers on contingency, it does not prevent individuals from pursuing their own cases, hiring an attorney on an hourly basis, or seeking pro bono legal assistance.” (Ibid.)

Finally, the court held that it could not square the plaintiff’s “assertion that MICRA’s limitation on noneconomic damages violates the right to jury trial, with the Supreme Court’s explicit holdings that the Legislature is empowered to set the measure and amount of recoverable damages.” (Slip opn., p. 34.) According to the court, “MICRA’s damages cap is a legal limitation on recoverable damages and does not impair the jury’s factfinding role.” (Ibid.)