Daily Blast June 27, 2017

Yesterday, the Second Appellate District, Division Four (Los Angeles), issued an opinion in a writ proceeding addressing the meaning of “accrual” for purposes of the Government Claims Act’s (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) requirement that a plaintiff present a claim to a public entity within six months of the date that the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued. (Gov. Code, § 901.) In City of Pasadena v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (June 26, 2017, B280805) __ Cal.App.5th __, the court held that accrual is the date on which a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that he or she had suffered a compensable injury. (Slip. opn., p. 3.)

Sandra Reyes Jauregui and Mario Reyes Jauregui (“the Jaureguis”) sued the City of Pasadena (“the City”) for dangerous conditions of public property. They claimed Sandra Jauregui (“Sandra”) developed mesothelioma as a result of her father’s work for the City, which involved use of asbestos-containing products. (Slip. opn. pp. 3-4.) The City demurred arguing the Jaureguis failed to comply with the Government Claims Act’s requirement that a claim be presented within six months of accrual of the cause of action because the Jaureguis presented their claim to the City nearly 11 months after Sandra’s diagnosis. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) The Jaureguis argued that “accrual” meant the beginning of the limitations period, which under the applicable statue of limitations for injury based on asbestos exposure was not until the asbestos-related injury caused a disability, meaning loss of time from work. (Id. at pp. 9-10.) Because Sandra was never disabled, the Jaureguis urged the limitations period did not begin to run, and therefore, Sandra’s claim never accrued for the purpose of presenting a government claim. (Id. at p. 5.) The trial court overruled the demurrer finding that “accrual” meant when the limitations period commences. (Id. at p. 6.) The City petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal granted the City writ relief concluding “accrual” as used in Government Code section 901 means the date on which the cause of action became actionable. (Slip opn., pp. 13, 21.) Government Code section 911.2 requires that before a lawsuit is filed, claims against local public entities for personal injury must be presented to the entity within six months after accrual. (Id. at p. 7.) Government Code section 901 defines the date of the accrual as “the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the [applicable] statute of limitations.” (Id. at pp. 8-9.) Under the statute of limitations applicable to the Jaureguis’ cause of action—Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2—the limitations period on the Jaureguis’ claim would not begin to run until her asbestos-related injury precluded her from working. (Id. at p. 10.) That section, however, does not use the term “accrued.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal explained that in the context of statutes of limitations, “accrual” is used in the sense of ripeness—when a cause of action is complete with all of its elements, or when the plaintiff discovers or has reason to discover the cause of action under the discovery rule. (Id. at pp. 11-12.) In the majority of cases, the date of accrual and the date the statute of limitations begins to run will be the same. (Id. at p. 14.) Here, however, the Jaureguis’ cause of action was ripe for suit even though the statute of limitations on their action may never begin to run. (Id. at p. 10.)

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