Jones Act Seaman Status Awarded to Vessel Repairer Operating a Land Based Crane at Time of Injury

Case:
Naquin v. Elevating Boats LLC,
Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
No 12-31258 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014).

Larry Naquin, Sr., an employee of Elevating Boats, LLC, was injured on November 17, 2009, when a land based crane he was operating failed, resulting in a severely broken right foot and a broken left foot, among other injuries. In addition, the falling crane crushed a building in which Mr. Naquin’s cousin’s husband was working, resulting in his death. Mr. Naquin did not learn of this until later that day or the following day.

Mr. Naquin was a vessel repair supervisor whose primary responsibility was the maintenance and repair of Elevating Boat’s fleet of 26-30 lift-boats. The evidence at trial was that he spent 70% of his time actually aboard these lift-boats, most of which was while they were docked, moored or jacked-up in his employer’s shipyard canal, although he did spend some time working on lift-boats while they were in open water, occasionally filling in as crane operator. The balance of his time was spent on land, working in the fabrication shop or operating the land based crane, the task he was performing when the accident occurred. The jury found him to be a Jones Act seaman and awarded significant damages, including $1,000,000 for past and future physical pain and suffering, $1,000,000 for past and future metal pain and suffering, and $400,000 for future lost wages.

Elevating Boats appealed the jury’s finding of seaman status to the Fifth Circuit, asserting the evidence was insufficient to establish seaman status or their negligence, and that the District Court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Naquin’s cousin’s husband’s death in connection with his claim for damages.

A split Fifth Circuit decision on the issue of status authored by Judge W. Eugene Davis and concurred in by an Eastern District Judge sitting by designation, affirmed the jury’s determination, despite Elevating Boats’ argument that Mr. Naquin was working as a ship repairman, one of the specifically identified jobs listed in the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA”). The majority held whether a person qualifies as a Jones Act seaman must first be determined, without regard to whether they might also qualify as a longshoreman under the LHWCA. Referring heavily to its earlier decision in In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F. 3d 287 (5th Cir. 1987), the Court again noted that even “a ship repairman (which is traditional longshoreman work and is one of the enumerated occupations under the LHWCA) may qualify for seaman status if he has the requisite employment-related connection to the vessel.” Finding both that Mr. Naquin’s work contributed to the function of his employer’s fleet of vessels and that his connection to that fleet was substantial in terms of both duration and nature due to the 70% percent of time spent on them, the jury’s determination of seaman status was supported. The result was not altered because the vessels were usually docked and he wasn’t often exposed to dangers of the open sea and spent nearly every night in his own land based home.

Elevating Boats also appealed the jury finding of negligence, arguing it was based solely on circumstantial evidence, which was inappropriate when Plaintiff had not expressly pled the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Although there was no direct evidence of why the weld in question failed, it was undisputed that they designed, constructed, operated and maintained the crane. Thus, the panel held that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of negligence.

The panel did reverse the jury’s damages award, requiring a new trial on damages, noting that under the Jones Act, “emotional damages resulting purely from another person’s injury, and not from a fear of injury to one’s self, are not compensable.” The Jones Act only permits recovery for emotional harm suffered from “almost being physically injured” because one was in the “zone of danger” which resulted in actual injury to another. As Mr. Naquin was not in the same “zone of danger” as his deceased relative (within the collapsed building), it was error to allow admission of such evidence and as it could not be determined to what extent the damages were tainted by the arguments concerning the inadmissible emotional damage, an entirely new trial on damages was required.