Louisiana Appellate Court Suggests Chandris’ 30% Rule for Seaman Status is Only a Guideline

Case:Baldwin v. CleanBlast, LLC
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
2015 La. App. LEXIS 187 (La. App. 3 Cir. 02/04/15)

Mark Baldwin, an employee of CleanBlast, LLC, was assigned to work as a sandblaster/painter on various rigs and platforms located in the navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico. After sustaining injuries in a fall, Baldwin sought compensation pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law. His employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a determination that Baldwin was not a seaman given the circumstances of his assignment and that his work was primarily conducted on platforms. Although the trial court initially denied the motion, it later entered summary judgment in favor of the employer after supplementation of evidence, dismissing Baldwin’s Jones Act claim, as well as the claim for maintenance and cure.

The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal began its analysis by noting that the focus of CleanBlast’s motion was on the second element of the Chandris test. The appellate court acknowledged Baldwin’s testimony established he spent less than thirty percent of his time in the service of a vessel. Under Chandris, this should have been enough to warrant dismissal of the Jones Act claims. The Third Circuit, however, refused to find this figure (described as “at most 28.65%”) dispositive of Baldwin’s seaman status.

Reasoning the Chandris Court had described the thirty-percent figure only as a rule of thumb, but as “no more than a guideline established by years of experience,” and had further suggested “departure from it will certainly be justified in appropriate cases,” the appellate court concluded that the work described by Baldwin did not have a clearly inadequate temporal connection to the vessel he did his work from so as to support only one reasonable view.

Specifically, the court noted that Baldwin was on a multi-week assignment, which required platform work and necessitated the use of vessels. Baldwin was assigned to one such vessel. While Baldwin had no operational duties aboard the vessel, the appellate court refused to find that, as a matter of law, Baldwin did not have a substantial connection to the vessel in terms of duration and nature. First, based on Baldwin’s account of his vessel/platform activities, his hourly work was only slightly below the Chandris thirty percent figure. Additionally, a fact-finder could certainly determine that Baldwin’s assignment, which required repeated, week-long periods at sea, “even in times of foul weather,” were circumstances that exposed him to the perils of the sea. Because of these circumstances, and despite the majority of Baldwin’s work was obviously platform-based, the appellate court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed, reversed the trial court’s seaman status determination, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Chandris 30% rule has long been the rule of thumb for determining whether one seeking seaman status has a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in duration and nature. Although the 28.65% in Baldwin was close to the 30%, if 28% becomes the standard, then there is certainly a good argument that 25% will suffice. Given the much favored remedies available under the Jones Act over the alternative LHWCA and state compensation remedies, this decision exacerbates a slippery slope.